Rethinking South Asia: scenarios for a changing geopolitical landscape by Wagner, Christian
www.ssoar.info
Rethinking South Asia: scenarios for a changing
geopolitical landscape
Wagner, Christian
Veröffentlichungsversion / Published Version
Stellungnahme / comment
Zur Verfügung gestellt in Kooperation mit / provided in cooperation with:
Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP)
Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation:
Wagner, C. (2017). Rethinking South Asia: scenarios for a changing geopolitical landscape. (SWP Comment,
30/2017). Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik -SWP- Deutsches Institut für Internationale Politik und Sicherheit.
https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-54430-3
Nutzungsbedingungen:
Dieser Text wird unter einer Deposit-Lizenz (Keine
Weiterverbreitung - keine Bearbeitung) zur Verfügung gestellt.
Gewährt wird ein nicht exklusives, nicht übertragbares,
persönliches und beschränktes Recht auf Nutzung dieses
Dokuments. Dieses Dokument ist ausschließlich für
den persönlichen, nicht-kommerziellen Gebrauch bestimmt.
Auf sämtlichen Kopien dieses Dokuments müssen alle
Urheberrechtshinweise und sonstigen Hinweise auf gesetzlichen
Schutz beibehalten werden. Sie dürfen dieses Dokument
nicht in irgendeiner Weise abändern, noch dürfen Sie
dieses Dokument für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke
vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, aufführen, vertreiben oder
anderweitig nutzen.
Mit der Verwendung dieses Dokuments erkennen Sie die
Nutzungsbedingungen an.
Terms of use:
This document is made available under Deposit Licence (No
Redistribution - no modifications). We grant a non-exclusive, non-
transferable, individual and limited right to using this document.
This document is solely intended for your personal, non-
commercial use. All of the copies of this documents must retain
all copyright information and other information regarding legal
protection. You are not allowed to alter this document in any
way, to copy it for public or commercial purposes, to exhibit the
document in public, to perform, distribute or otherwise use the
document in public.
By using this particular document, you accept the above-stated
conditions of use.
  Dr. habil. Christian Wagner is a Senior Fellow in SWP’s Asia Division SWP Comments 30 
  August 2017 
1 
Stiftung  
Wissenschaft und 
Politik 
German Institute  
for International and 
Security Affairs  
SW
P
 C
om
m
en
ts
 
 
Introduction 
 
 
Rethinking South Asia 
Scenarios for a Changing Geopolitical Landscape 
Christian Wagner 
A number of developments suggest that South Asia’s political geography will be re-
structured in the medium to long term. The main external drivers are infrastructure 
projects – first and foremost the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) – which open 
up new development opportunities for many countries in the region. At the same 
time relations between India and Pakistan, which were are the heart of any analysis 
on South Asia, are becoming increasingly decoupled. The already weak South Asian 
Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) may become even less important and 
is likely to be replaced by new cooperation formats. 
 
Economic growth of 6.5 percent in 2016 
makes South Asia 2016 one of the world’s 
fastest-growing regions. Yet it is also still 
one of the poorest globally, and – with the 
lingering Kashmir conflict between the 
nuclear powers India and Pakistan – one of 
the most dangerous crisis regions. South 
Asia is also one of the economically least 
integrated regions, with intra-regional 
trade accounting for just 5 percent. The 
SAARC, founded in 1985, draws regular 
criticism for producing “reports but no 
results”. Although its summits have some-
times contributed to confidence-building 
at the highest levels, they have often had 
to be postponed on account of tensions 
between India and Pakistan, most recently 
in autumn 2016. 
The regional configuration of South Asia 
as manifested in the SAARC appears to be 
undergoing a deep transformation. India 
and Pakistan, whose volatile relationship 
has for decades been the epicentre of any 
discussion about South Asia, are increasing-
ly setting new foreign policy priorities. 
And at the same time external factors like 
China’s BRI are offering new incentives for 
cooperation. 
India and Pakistan: New foreign 
policy priorities 
India and Pakistan find themselves facing 
new foreign policy challenges, leading each 
to reinterpret their relationship. 
Following a brief warming in 2014 after 
Narendra Modi took office, India’s bilateral 
relations with Pakistan have cooled notice-
ably again. Tentative dialogue initiatives, 
for instance in late 2015, were dashed by 
terrorist attacks in 2016. Countless skir-
mishes and incidents along the interna-
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tional border and the Line of Control in 
Kashmir have cost many casualties and 
make the cease-fire agreed in 2003 appear 
increasingly futile. The September 2016 
attack in Uri by militant groups from 
Pakistan provoked two Indian responses. 
Firstly, New Delhi launched a commando 
operation against the infrastructure of 
militant groups on the Pakistani side of 
the Line of Control – revealing publicly the 
form of covert warfare both sides have prac-
tised there for many years. Secondly, India 
began working to isolate Pakistan in the 
region, starting by withdrawing from the 
November 2016 SAARC summit in Islama-
bad; other SAARC members joined the boy-
cott. Instead, New Delhi threw its weight 
behind the November 2016 Goa summit 
of the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sec-
toral Technical and Economic Cooperation 
(BIMSTEC), inviting two states – Afghani-
stan and the Maldives – that were members 
of SAARC but not of BIMSTEC. Given that 
Pakistan is not a member of BIMSTEC, the 
meeting could thus be viewed as a “SAARC 
minus one” summit. In their final declara-
tion the participants underlined the im-
portance of working together to combat 
terrorism – very obviously pointing a finger 
at Pakistan. 
While Pakistan’s foreign policy is still 
defined by India and the Kashmir question, 
its priorities are changing too. A strong 
turn to China and growing financial depen-
dency resulting from heavy Chinese invest-
ment in the China-Pakistan Economic Cor-
ridor (CPEC) (see below) is reconfiguring 
Islamabad’s foreign policy options, as is 
the simultaneously cooling of political and 
economic relations with the United States 
(see SWP Comment 25/2016). 
The conflicts in the Middle East have be-
come increasingly important for Pakistan, 
above all the rivalry between Saudi Arabia 
and Iran. Pakistan is home to the world’s 
second-largest Shia population, surpassed 
only by Iran, and sectarian violence be-
tween militant Sunni and Shiite groupings 
has been an issue since the 1980s. Pakistan 
has maintained very close economic, poli-
tical and military relations with Saudi 
Arabia for many years. Riyadh took in Paki-
stani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif follow-
ing the 1999 coup, and almost 900,000 
Pakistanis work in Saudi Arabia. Pakistan 
has joined Saudi Arabia’s military alliance 
fighting Shiite rebel groups in Yemen. 
Even as the conflict with India drags on, 
the urgency of the Kashmir question ap-
pears to fading in Pakistan too. In January 
2017 the new Chief of Army Staff, General 
Qamar Javed Bajwa, said that the fight 
against terrorism within Pakistan remained 
one of the most important security chal-
lenges. In January 2017 Jamaat-ud-Dawa 
leader Hafiz Saeed was placed under house 
arrest charged with terrorism offences. 
Jamaat-ud-Dawa is regarded as the political 
wing of Lashkar-e-Taiba, which has been 
responsible for countless attacks in India 
and Kashmir. In the past Lashkar-e-Taiba 
has received significant support from the 
Pakistani security forces. 
In April this year General Bajwa declared 
that “political” support for the Kashmiri 
struggle would continue – raising questions 
over the future relationship between the 
security forces and the militant groups. 
Although Pakistan encouraged the wave 
of protests in Indian-administered Kashmir 
in summer 2016, the signs of Islamisation 
observed in the protest movement were 
directed not only against India but now – 
in a new departure – also to a certain ex-
tent against Pakistan. 
These developments reveal a shift in the 
foreign policy priorities of both countries. 
Pakistan has indicated this year that it 
would be willing to resume dialogue. But 
New Delhi insists that talks will only be 
possible once attacks within India have 
ceased. The death sentence for an Indian 
spy in Pakistan and Modi’s remarks on the 
deteriorating human rights situation in 
Pakistan-administered Kashmir and Balo-
chistan underline the low odds on dialogue 
resuming any time soon. 
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Infrastructure projects 
The most significant factor driving long-
term change in South Asia’s political geo-
graphy is a string of infrastructure projects, 
first and foremost the Chinese Belt and 
Road Initiative (BRI). 
Pakistan has to date been the biggest 
beneficiary of the BRI in South Asia, with 
Beijing promising investments of more 
than $60 billion for the China-Pakistan 
Economic Corridor (CPEC). Despite reserva-
tions over issues such as growing debt and 
business concerns over Chinese competi-
tion, Islamabad places great hopes in CPEC. 
In Pakistan the project is discussed as a 
“game changer” or even a “fate” or “destiny 
changer”. 
China has also invested massively in 
other South Asian states. In 2016 Beijing 
promised Bangladesh state and private in-
vestments amounting to roughly $38 bil-
lion. In spring 2017 it said it would invest 
$8.3 billion in Nepal. Sri Lanka, where 
China invested more than $14 billion be-
tween 2005 and 2015, also illustrates the 
problems and challenges facing Beijing 
in the region. Infrastructure projects like 
the Hambantota New Port are regarded as 
economically unprofitable while criticism 
of Sri Lanka’s growing Chinese debts esca-
lates. In response the government of Presi-
dent Maithripala Sirisena has been rebuild-
ing ties with India since his election in 
2015. As such, the success of Chinese invest-
ments depends on domestic political fac-
tors like democratic elections and changes 
of government – over which Beijing has 
little sway. 
As well as BRI, other infrastructure pro-
jects also play their role in reshaping the 
region. Iran, Russia and India are pushing 
ahead with the International North–South 
Transport Corridor (INSTC). In May 2016 
India committed to invest $500 million in 
developing the Iranian port of Chabahar, 
which will improve its access to Afghani-
stan and Central Asia. Although specula-
tion has arisen as to whether and to what 
extent these two major projects will exacer-
bate geopolitical rivalries among India, 
Iran, China and Pakistan, some of the 
participating states regard the projects as 
essentially complementary. China has al-
ready declared its interest in the Chabahar 
development, while Iran intends to par-
ticipate in CPEC. China and India are work-
ing together with Bangladesh and Myan-
mar to establish the BCIM Corridor linking 
the southern Chinese provinces by road 
with the Indian subcontinent. 
Beijing wanted India to participate in 
the BRI summit in May 2017. But New 
Delhi refused because CPEC runs through 
Pakistani-administered Kashmir, which is 
claimed by India. Moreover, the Indian 
government criticised the high levels of debt 
generated by the Chinese infrastructure 
investments. New Delhi fears that this will 
increase the political dependency of the 
recipient countries on China. Indian secu-
rity experts regard the Chinese investments 
in port facilities in South Asia as potential 
military bases that could serve to encircle 
India (String of Pearls). But despite bilateral 
problems and regional rivalries, India and 
China cooperate closely at the international 
level. Both belong to the BRICS group (Bra-
zil, Russia, India, China, South Africa), and 
India also participates in the Asian Infra-
structure Investment Bank (AIIB) initiated 
by China. Further, in June 2017 India 
joined the Shanghai Cooperation Orga-
nisation (SCO), which is led by China and 
Russia. 
Scenarios: SAARC 2.0, South Asia 2.0 
These developments may lead to two sce-
narios: SAARC 2.0 and South Asia 2.0. In 
the SAARC 2.0 scenario, the organisation’s 
members use Chinese investment to im-
prove their national infrastructure and ex-
pand intra-regional trade. This could help 
to enhance regional connectivity and thus 
strengthen SAARC as a whole. 
In contrast, the South Asia 2.0 scenario 
will see only a marginal role for SAARC. As 
long as the South Asian countries neglect 
structural reforms and economic diversifica-
tion they have few incentives to expand 
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intra-regional trade. Their trade flows will 
tend instead to gravitate towards China and 
other attractive export markets. China is 
also politically more attractive than India 
for most of the states in the region: India’s 
neighbours have repeatedly grasped oppor-
tunities to play the “China card” to counter 
what they regard as overpowering Indian 
influence. 
In view of the scope of investment, Paki-
stan appears at first glance to be the biggest 
beneficiary of this trend. Yet CPEC repre-
sents an economic and political wager for 
Islamabad. The economic benefits will need 
to be large enough to offset growing long-
term debts to China. At the same time, 
CPEC could curtail Pakistan’s foreign policy 
options, especially vis-à-vis India. And the 
large volume of Chinese investment is also 
a bet on the status quo in the region. China 
will have little interest in the Pakistani 
security forces embarking on new military 
adventures like the 1999 Kargil War in 
order to internationalise the Kashmir ques-
tion. 
India might appear to be the biggest 
loser, joining in the process of expanding 
regional connectivity but unable to match 
China’s growing economic investments 
and political presence in the region. Yet 
through its Pakistan policy of recent years 
India is also a driver in the process of re-
configuring South Asia, with regional for-
mats like BIMSTEC and the Indian Ocean 
Rim Association (IORA) becoming increas-
ingly attractive. They are more politically 
homogeneous than the SAARC and fit into 
India’s “Act East” policy orientated on East 
Asia. 
If developments proceed along such a 
trajectory, they will transform the political 
geography of South Asia in the medium to 
long term. 
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